What will be different after COVID-19? Three broad viewpoints are emerging.
1) Hibernation followed by a return to business as usual as quickly as possible. The centre-right Australian government is a good example of this approach. It has decided that, for the duration of the coronavirus lockdown, the economy needs to be put into 'cryogenic suspension', in the words of Treasurer Josh Frydenberg. This has now morphed into 'hibernation' as the preferred term. Scott Morrison has emphasised supporting business to hibernate so they can resume business-as-usual on the other side of the lockdown.
To support this strategy the centre-right Liberal-National government in Australia has committed to cornucopian levels of expenditure, currently running to hundreds of billions of A$, and rising with each new announcement. The bulk of the money is going to business not citizens. Let's put to one side the irony that this is from a government that, for years, has been banging on about cutting taxes, removing restrictions on business and getting rid of the budget deficit - a deficit blamed on the centre-left Labour government's stimulus packages in response to the 2008 financial crisis. The measures announced have been labelled temporary. The cash-splash and many of the measures adopted may look like socialism, but the goal is to facilitate a return to business-as-usual and save capitalism.
2) Exacerbation, whether intentional or not, of many of the worst aspects of existing social order. As economist Dani Rodrik has commented, the crisis has thrown 'the dominant characteristics of each country’s politics into sharper relief. Countries have in effect become exaggerated versions of themselves... it is likely to intensify and entrench already existing trends.'
In particular, on this view, we can expect an exacerbation of inequality in countries already highly unequal (Brazil, South Africa, India, the USA etc). We can expect greater inequality between countries, with the poorest countries emerging with increased debt, and with the export-oriented development strategies they have been encouraged to adopt, looking less and less credible. We can expect greater levels of surveillance (see China and Israel), and a contraction of democracy by the autocratically-inclined (eg Hungary). The ways in which the existing elites, in a number of countries, have used the crisis to achieve their goals whilst attention is focussed on COVID-19, is sad confirmation of this view (see this account of the Keystone XL pipeline).
1) Hibernation followed by a return to business as usual as quickly as possible. The centre-right Australian government is a good example of this approach. It has decided that, for the duration of the coronavirus lockdown, the economy needs to be put into 'cryogenic suspension', in the words of Treasurer Josh Frydenberg. This has now morphed into 'hibernation' as the preferred term. Scott Morrison has emphasised supporting business to hibernate so they can resume business-as-usual on the other side of the lockdown.
To support this strategy the centre-right Liberal-National government in Australia has committed to cornucopian levels of expenditure, currently running to hundreds of billions of A$, and rising with each new announcement. The bulk of the money is going to business not citizens. Let's put to one side the irony that this is from a government that, for years, has been banging on about cutting taxes, removing restrictions on business and getting rid of the budget deficit - a deficit blamed on the centre-left Labour government's stimulus packages in response to the 2008 financial crisis. The measures announced have been labelled temporary. The cash-splash and many of the measures adopted may look like socialism, but the goal is to facilitate a return to business-as-usual and save capitalism.
2) Exacerbation, whether intentional or not, of many of the worst aspects of existing social order. As economist Dani Rodrik has commented, the crisis has thrown 'the dominant characteristics of each country’s politics into sharper relief. Countries have in effect become exaggerated versions of themselves... it is likely to intensify and entrench already existing trends.'
In particular, on this view, we can expect an exacerbation of inequality in countries already highly unequal (Brazil, South Africa, India, the USA etc). We can expect greater inequality between countries, with the poorest countries emerging with increased debt, and with the export-oriented development strategies they have been encouraged to adopt, looking less and less credible. We can expect greater levels of surveillance (see China and Israel), and a contraction of democracy by the autocratically-inclined (eg Hungary). The ways in which the existing elites, in a number of countries, have used the crisis to achieve their goals whilst attention is focussed on COVID-19, is sad confirmation of this view (see this account of the Keystone XL pipeline).
3) Transformation, and redressing the many shortcomings in our societies that the crisis has revealed. The COVID-19 crisis has shown things like:
- the lack of social security systems that are fit for purpose,
- the fact that those regarded as 'essential' workers are often the lowest paid and most undervalued,
- the majority of citizens in most countries live from hand-to-mouth and have few resources to call upon in emergencies,
- that many countries no longer make critical commodities or have privatised their ability to perform critical functions,
- if we can get homeless people housed within days, why can't we do so in 'normal' times? and,
- if we can tolerate this level of disruption and expenditure to address COVID-19, why can't we mobilise seriously to combat climate change?
There are already signs that such observations and questions are gaining traction, in some countries more than others. Spain's economy minister has announced the intention to introduce a basic income. Calls to improve the conditions of many low-paid workers and regulate the gig and casual economies may be hard to resist. Poorer countries may look to renounce 'odious debt'. Public health provision may see improved funding.
Which of these three strategies prevails will depend in part on the inclinations of the governing class in each country, and in part on the popular experience of the crisis. Critically, much will depend on the extent to which people mobilise to ensure that the costs of this crisis are distributed fairly, in both class and generational terms.
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